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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in dismissing

Reagan Outdoor Advertising's (hereinafter "Reagan") petition
for a review of an administrative ruling when a notice of
appeal was timely filed with the administrative agency,
although not timely filed with the Court of Appeals?
2.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in holding that

the Utah Department of Transportation (the administrative
agency),

while

conducting

a

"formal

adjudicative

proceeding", is not the equivalent of a "court?"

OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals dismissed Reagan's petition for
review as untimely filec^.

The full opinion of this order

is at page A-l of the Appendix.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals entered its decision in this
matter on October 16, 1989.

Section 78-2-2 (5) of the Utah

Code (1989) confers jurisdiction on this Court to review the
Court of Appeal's decision by a writ of certiorari.

CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES and REGULATIONS
Pertinent provisions in this case come from the Utah
Code and the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
1

They are

to be found at Section 63-46b-16 (2) (a) of the Utah Code
(1988) and Rules 4 (a) and 14 (a) of the Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals; the full texts of which are included in
the appendix.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
By a notice dated January 11, 1989, the Utah Department
of

Transportation,

District

One

(hereinafter

"UDOT"),

advised Reagan that an outdoor advertising structure it
maintains at approximately 287 South Main in Layton, Utah,
and is also adjacent to the west side of 1-15, near milepost
3 32.87, was in violation of the Utah Outdoor Advertising
Act, specifically, section 27-12-136.5 of the Utah Code
(1989),

in that

the

structure

was

less

than

distance from a previously existing outdoor
sign.

Reagan disputed

500

feet

advertising

this allegation and requested a

hearing as directed by the UDOT notice.
A hearing was held on May 8, 1989, before Mr. Clinton
D. Topham, the District One director.

The director ruled

in favor of UDOT, determining that pursuant to measurements
taken along the highway right of way line as directed by
paragraph 1 of section VII of UDOT regulations the Reagan
sign was less than 500 feet from a previously

2

existing

sign. A written order incorporating the director's findings
was entered on June 19, 1989.
Reagan

requested

reconsideration

of the

director's

finding and submitted that it had evidence, pursuant to a
site survey, that the sign was more than 500 feet distance
as measured along the highway right of way line.

This

request was summarily denied by Mr. Topham on July 13, 1989.
Reagan thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal of the UDOT
ruling with the District One director, Mr. Topham, on August
14, 1989.

The Petition for Review to the Utah Court of

Appeals was filed August 27th (or 28th), 1989, after the
Notice of Appeal was returned by UDOT to Reagan. On October
16, 1989, pursuant to a UDOT motion to dismiss, the appeal
was dismissed by the Utah Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

Reagan's appeal of the administrative ruling was

originally filed, admittedly with the UDOT agency, on August
14, 1989; which was a timely filing under section 63-46b-14
(3) (a) of the Utah Code (1988) and Rule 6 (a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

At this time an appeal bond in

the amount of $300.00 was also filed and the court fee for
an appeal tendered.
2.

Reagan filed its Petition for a judicial review of

the agency proceeding with the Utah Court of Appeals on
August 28, 1989, according to section 63-46b-16 of the Utah
3

Code (1988).
from

the

This was, admittedly, more than thirty days

agency

order

denying

Reagan's

request

for

reconsideration.
ARGUMENT
This case has been handled pursuant to the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act, Section 63-46b et seq. of the
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), which first became
effective on January 1, 1988.

It was originally heard

before the Utah Department of Transportation

("UDOT"),

District One, sitting in Ogden, Utah, Clinton D. Topham,
P.E.,

District One

conducted

pursuant

Director, presiding,

and

allegedly

to

for

"formal"

adjudicative proceedings.

the

procedures

Sections 63-46b-6 through 10 of

the Utah Code (1987-88).
Certainly,

UDOT,

District

One,

under

these

circumstances, sat as a Court, both by definition and by
statute.

Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. 318 (1979), ("An

organized body with defined powers, meeting at certain times
and places for the hearing and decision of causes and other
matters brought before it .

.

. " ) ; Section 63-46b-l (1)

(a), supra, ("[A]11 state agency actions that determine the
legal rights, duties, privileges, immunities, or other legal
interests of one or more identifiable persons . . .")

It

should be viewed, and treated, as such.
The original Notice of Appeal filed with Department
One of UDOT was also served upon the Respondent, the Utah
4

Department of Transportation, and follows virtually the same
format and contains the same information as the Petition for
Review filed in this Court. In reality these two documents
represent the same thing, by whatever title they are called.
The purpose of Rules 4 and 14 of the Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals are fulfilled by either document.
The original "Notice of Appeal" was filed August 14,
1989.

This was a Monday.

It was accepted for filing, at

that time, by UDOT. Whether under Rule 4 or 14 of the Rules
of the Utah Court of Appeals the "Notice of Appeal" (or
"Petition for Review") was to be filed within 3 0 days.
Thirty days from July 13th, the date of the "Court's" order,
was August 12th, but this was a Saturday. Under Rule 6 (a)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Saturdays, Sundays and
legal holidays shall not be computed in the last day of the
pertinent time period.

Filing on Monday, the 14th, was

therefore timely.
The only real issue for review under the instant motion
is whether or not the filing of the "Notice of Appeal"
(which was included for information purposes in the filing
to the Court of Appeals with the "Petition for Review") at
the District One UDOT offices, rather than immediately with
the Utah Court of Appeals, sufficiently complies with the
purpose and intent of the statutes to invest this Court with
jurisdiction in this matter.

The purpose of a "Notice of

Appeal" or "Petition for Review" is the same; to give notice
5

of an intent to appeal. Wood v. Turner, 18 Utah 2d 229, 419
P.2d 634 (1966).

See also. Associates Financial Services

v. S e w , 776 P.2d 650, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 63 (CA 1989) and
Black1 s, supra, at 958.

Reagan has complied with these

express purposes.
In the Wood case, supra, the Utah Supreme Court held:
Our Constitution assures the right of
appeal in all cases to the end that claims
errors or abuses may be reviewed by another
tribunal. It is usually held that statutes
implementing the right of appeal are liberally
construed and applied in the furtherance of
justice; and that an interpretation which will
prevent that right from being exercised is not
favored. The purpose of a notice of appeal is
to advise the opposite party that the appeal
has been taken and of the essential requisites
thereto. If it does so in substance, it
should be given effect and mere technical defects should not defeat the right of appeal. (Erryhasis
added.)
Id.
In the recent case of Associates Financicil Services v.
Sevy, supra, this Court held that, n[T]he purpose of the
notice of appeal is fundamentally to give notice that an
appeal has been taken . . ."]

(Finding that no party was

misinformed by the error.)
Furthermore,
substantially

Reagan,

complied

in

with

the

the

instant

statute.

case,

has

"Substantial

compliance" means that the spirit of the procedural

or

jurisdictional requirements have been satisfied in that the
intent for which the statute was adopted have been carried

6

out

in

light

of the

facts of

each particular case.

Patterson v. Dept. of Labor, 678 P.2d 1262 (Wa. 1984).

See

also, Gutierrez v. City of Albuquerque, 631 P.2d 304, 96
N.M. 398 (1981), ("Substantial compliance has occurred when
the statute has been sufficiently followed so as to carry
out the intent for which it was adopted and serve the
purpose of the statute.11)
Illustrative of this is Las Vegas Plywood and Lumber,
Inc. , v. D & D Enterprises, 649 P.2d 1367, 98 Nev. 378
(1982) . In this case the appellant did not strictly comply
with Nevada's mechanics lien statute in that it failed to
post a copy of the notice of lien on the property subject
to the lien. However, the appellant did mail a copy of the
notice to the respondent.

This did not fully comply with

the statutory requirements. The Nevada Supreme Court ruled
that appellant had

substantially

complied

because

the

respondent received actual notice pursuant to the mailing.
In reaching its decision the Nevada court stated:
The spirit and purpose of the [mechanic's
lien statute] is to do substantial justice to
all parties who may be affected by its provisions;
and that courts should avoid "unfriendly strictness and mere technicality. This rule should
always be followed where the objections urged
serve only to perplex and embarrass a remedy intended to be simple and summary. . .
Id. at 1371.
(Colo. 1987).

See alsof People v. Greathouse, 742 P.2d 334
(Notice of appeal was filed within the

prescribed time frame but in the wrong court and was

7

therefore alleged to be untimely.

The Colorado Supreme

Court allowed the appeal because either court bestowed
jurisdiction.)
Two cases were cited by UDOT in its motion before the
Court of Appeals to dismiss Reagan's Petition for Review.
Neither of the cases cited have direct application to the
instant matter.

Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply

Co. , 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984), dealt with the issue of a
failure to remit the requisite filing fee for an appeal at
the time the notice of appeal was filed.

In the instant

case the filing fees were tendered at the sarnie time as the
Notices were filed.
In Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466 P.2d 843
(1970), the Supreme Court ruled that a district court could
not subsequently confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court
once the Supreme Court had once dismissed

an appeal.

(Plaintiffs filed motion to dismiss appeal; defendants did
not respond and appeal was dismissed.

Later, defendants

attempted to procure relief from late filing on motion for
new trial in district court.)

CONCLUSION
This case is believed to be the first appeal taken from
a ruling of the Department of Transportation under the
relatively

new

Administrative

Procedures

Act.

The

Respondent, the Utah Department of Transportation, was
8

timely notified that Reagan was appealing the decision of
UDOT, Department One.

(After all, they are the same entity

anyway.)
Although Rule 14 of the Rules of this Court provides
for direct filing of appeals to it and not to the agency
most appeals are filed directly with the court from which
the appeal is being taken.

Rule 4 (a) of the Rules of the

Utah Court of Appeals. UDOT, District One, in this case was
most certainly acting in the capacity of a court of law.
The

agency,

UDOT,

accepted

the

filing.

(They

were

apparently not then aware of the provisions of Rule 14,
either, being new to having to deal with appeals.) Had they
not accepted the filing and advised Reagan of this Reagan
would have taken the notice to the Court of Appeals. Reagan
immediately filed in the Court of Appeals once the mistake
was discovered.
Despite this oversight adequate notice to the other
party, the Respondent, has been given.

The purpose of the

notice provisions have been complied with; and, under the
circumstances, Rule 14 of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals has been substantially complied with, Reagan should
be allowed to proceed with its appeal, and this Court should
deny Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.

9

RESPECTFULLY submitted this

is-*k
/ o '**• day

of November,

1989.

•<=^af
Douglas T. Hall
Attorney for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) copies of the
foregoing Petition to Ralph L Finlayson, attorney for
Respondent, at 23 6 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah
84114, first class postage prepaid this
/ S~& day of
October, 1989.

U-J-^zyOf
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C/^Mi«
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
"• •-'-'.:*/.: ?A *r.% Court

ooOoo
Reagan Outdoor Advertising,
Inc., and Douglas Madsen,
Petitioners,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Case No. 890511-CA

Utah Department of
Transportation,
Respondent.
Before Judges Orme, Garff and Davidson (On Law and Motion).
Upon respondent's motion to dismiss the petition for review
as untimely filed, it appearing that the petition was not
properly filed under R. Utah Ct. App. 14(a) until July 28,
1989, and that the filing of a notice of appeal with the
administrative agency is without efficacy under Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-16(2)(a) (1989), said motion is hereby granted.
The Department of Transportation is not the equivalent of a
•• court" within the meaning of R. Utah Ct. App. 4(a) and the
A.L.J, does not conduct a Hearing as a "court of law." See R.
Utah Ct. App. 18. Appeal from a formal administrative
adjudication is by original petition to the appellate court
under R. Utah Ct. App. 14. The filing of a petition for review
commences the judicial proceeding. In the absence of
petitioner's timely compliance with Rule 18, this court lacks
jurisdiction to review the administrative decision. See also
R. Utah Ct. App. 4C (limiting the transfer of misfiled appeals
and petitions to the supreme court and the court of appeals.)
The above -entitled appeal from an adjudication of the
Department of Transportation is dismissed as untimely filed.
DATED this

tober, 1989.

FOR THE COURT

Gregory K

A-l

63-46b-16. Judicial review — Fonnal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) fa) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
»'b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
(i> against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
«ii) according to anv other Drovision of law

A_?

Rule 4. Appeal as of right: When taken.
fa) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal
is permitted as a matter of right from the district court, juvenile court, or
circuit court to the Court of Appeals, the notice of appeal reauired bv Rule 3
shall be filed with the clerk of the court from winch the appeal is taken within
30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from

Rule 14

r.UlXS 0? THE tTAH COURT OF APPEALS

TITLE III. REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT
OF ORDERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS, AND
COMMITTEES.
Rule 14. Review of administrative orders: How obtained;
intervention.
fa) Time for filing petition for review of administrative order- When
judicial review by this court of an order or decision of an administrative
agency is provided by starute, a petition for review shall be filed with the
clerk of the Court of Appeals within the time prescribed by stamte or, if there
is no time prescribed, wiihin 30 days after the date of the order or decision.
The term "agencv"' includes commission, board, committee, or officer.

A-3

PILED
AUG 271989

DOUGLAS T. HALL
Utah Bar No. 1305
1775 North, 900 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-1775

.Vifify T. Necran
Clark of tim Court
Utah Court of Apps«ls

Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Complaintant and
Respondent,

PETITION FOR REVIEW

vs.

Docket No.

REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING,
INC., Petitioner, and DOUGLAS
MADSEN,

fflnSII-ffr

Respondents.

COMES
Reagan
Rule

Outdoor
14

the

revoking

the

Petitioner,

Advertising,

R.O.A.

General, Inc., dba

through counsel, and pursuant to

of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, and hereby

Petitions
of

NOW

the
Utah

Utah Court of Appeals for a review of the Order
Department

Appellant's

Appellant's

of Transportation,

sign

sign, dated

District

One,

permit and ordering the removal of

June

19th, 1989, the Order denying

Petitioner's objection to the form of the Order, dated June

A-4

19, 1989, and the Order denying Appellant's Request for
Reconsideration, dated July 13, 1989.
DATED this jZffi^

day of August, 1989.

Douglas' T. Hall
Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I
of

the

hereby

certify that I caused a true and correct copy

foregoing

Finlayson,

Notice

Assistant

Attorney

Complaintant/Respondent,
Utah

84114,

Respondent,

and
at

of

Appeal to be mailed to Ralph L.
General

and

attorney for the

at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City,

to Douglas Madsen, the other, original named
1670

Church Street, Layton, Utah 84041, first

class postage prepaid, this

day of August, 1989.

A-5

DOUGLAS T. HALL
Utah Bat No. 1305
1775 North, 900 West
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 1
Telephone:
(801) 521-1775
A t t o r n e y for A p p e l l a n t
BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DISTRICT ONE

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Complaintant,
NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING,
INC., and DOUGLAS MADSEN,
Respondents.

COMES

NOW the

through c o u n s e l ,
Appeals,
Court

of

and

ordering

and p u r s u a n t to t h e Rules of t h e Utah Court of

hereby

Appeals

Transportation,

r e s p o n d e n t , Reagan Outdoor A d v e r t i s i n g ,

gives

from

the

notice

of i t s a p p e a l to the Utah

Orders of the Utah Department of

D i s t r i c t One, revoking A p p e l l a n t ' s s i g n p e r m i t ,

the

removal

of

Appellant's

sign,

and

denying

A p p e l l a n t ' s Request f o r R e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , dated J u l y 13, 1 9 8 9 .
DATED t h i s

/^^day

of August, 1989.

Douglas^T. Hall
A t t o r n e y for Respondent

A- 6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I
of

the

hereby
foregoing

certify that I caused a true and correct copy
Notice

of

Appeal to be mailed to Ralph L.

Finlayson, attorney for the Complaintant, at 236 State Capitol,
Salt

Lake

City, Utah 84114, first class postage prepaid, this
August, 1989.

rn

fy

A- 7

/7,

DOUGLAS T. HALL
Utah Bar No. 1305
1775 North, 900 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-1775
Attorney for Appellant
BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DISTRICT ONE

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Complaintant,
vs.
1
REAGAN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING,
INC., and DOUGLAS MADSEN,

NOTICE OF FILING
APPEAL BOND

]

Respondents.

COMES
through

NOW

the

re^jSondent, Reagan Outdoor Advertising,

counsel,

and

pursuant

to Rule 6 of the Rules of the

Utah Court of Appeals, and hereby gives notice of filing a cost
bond on appeal in the amount of $300.QQ with the above-entitled
agency.
DATED this

day of August, 1989.

Douglas T. Hall
^
Attorney for Respondent

A-8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I
of

the

hereby

certify that I caused a true and correct copy

foregoing Notice of Filing Appeal Bond to be mailed to

Ralph L. Finlayson, attorney for the Complaintant, at 236 State
Capitol,

Salt

prepaid, this

Lake

City,

1H&**t of

Utah

84114,

August, 1989.

A-9

first

class postage

634

utah

419

PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

IS Utah 2d 229
Virgil L. WOOD, Plaintiff,
v.
John W. TURNER, Warden, Utah
State Prison, Defendant.
No. 10471.

discretion of court; however, since written
judgment as filed was in accord with ruKngf
appealed from the ends of justice would be
best served by hearing case on its merits.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 61, 73(a)U.CA.1953, 68-3-2, 77-40-3, 77-42-ll>
Const, art. 8, § 9 .

Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 10, 196G.

3. Appeal and Error <§=>337(2)

Proceeding on motion to dismiss plaintiffs appeal from a denial of petition for
writ of habeas corpus by the Third District
Court, Sale Lake County, A. H. Ellett, J.
The Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held that
the premature filing of a notice of appeal
from denial of petition for writ of habeas
corpus, made within one month after trial
court had stated that petition was denied
but before the signing and filing of a formal judgment, was not a defect which
would ipso facto deprive appellate court of
jurisdiction, but an irregularity which could
be ground for dismissal of appeal within
discretion of court; however, since written
judgment as filed was in accord with ruling
appealed from the ends of justice would be
best served by hearing case on its merits.
Motion to dismiss appeal denied.

1. Appeal and Error C=4I I, 422
Purpose of notice of appeal is to advise
opposite party that the appeal has been
taken and of the essentials requisite thereto, and notice which does so in substance
should be given effect so that mere technical defects will not defeat right of appeal.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 61, 73(a);
Const, art. 8, § 9.
2. Habeas Corpus C==>113(6)
The premature filing of a notice of appeal from denial of petition for writ of habeas corpus, made within one month after
trial court had stated that petition was denied but before the signing and filing of a
formal judgment, was not a defect which
would ipso facto deprive appellate court of
jurisdiction, but an irregularity which could
be ground for dismissal of appeal within

The remedy of dismissal of appeal because of premature filing thereof would be
well advised in cases whore judgment had
not become definite or had not become
final, or where remedies before trial court
had not been exhausted. Rules of Civil
Procedure, rules 61, 7 3 ( a ) ; Const, art. 8
§9.

Jimi Mitsunaga, John D. O'Connell, Salt
Lake City, for appellant.
Phil L. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Ronald N.
Boyce, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for
respondent.
CROCKETT, Justice.
Defendant, Warden of the Utah State
Prison, moved to dismiss plaintiffs appeal
from a denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
The plaintiff, Virgil L. Wood, having
been found guilty of the crimes of robbery
and grand larceny by a jury on April 30,
1963, was sentenced to indeterminate terms
in the Utah State Prison as provided by law
for those crimes ; sentences to run consecutive to one the plaintiff was then serving.
A motion for a new trial was made and denied. On September 9, 1965 plaintiff filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
District Court of the Third Judicial District
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The
matter was heard on September 30, 1965, at
the conclusion- of which the court stated
that the petition was denied. This is indicated in the record. Within the- one month
allowed for appeal under Rule 73(a), U.R.
C.P., to wit, on October 1, 1965 the plaintiff
duly served and filed a notice of appeal.
Four days thereafter, on October 5, 196:\
there was signed and filed a formal judg-
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ment denying the petition. Defendant contends that the plaintiffs notice of appeal
having thus been filed prematurely, this
court is without jurisdiction to entertain the
appeal.
It is true that this court has previously
held that the filing of a notice of appeal
after the expiration of the one month allowed by the rule is a jurisdictional defect. 1
Our conclusion in this case represents no
departure from that holding. But counsel
has not cited, nor has our research discovered any case which has ruled that the
premature filing of a notice of appeal deprives this court of jurisdiction.
[1] Our Constitution assures the right
•of appeal in all cases to the end that claimed
errors or abuses may be reviewed by another tribunal. 2 It is usually held that statutes implementing the right of appeal are
liberally construed and applied in the furtherance of justice; and that an interpretation which will prevent that right from
being exercised is not favored. 3 The purpose of a notice of appeal is to advise the
opposite party that the appeal has been
taken and of the essentials requisite thereto.
If it does so in substance, it should be given
effect and mere technical defects should not
defeat the right of appeal. 4 This is in accord with the generally desirable objective
of not placing undue stress on technicalities
where others are not adversely affected.
Rule 61, U.R.C.P. provides that, " * * *
no error or defect in * * * anything
done or omitted by the court or by any of
the parties, is ground for * * * disturbing a,judgment or order, unless refusal
to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice." 5
'• See Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d
277,282 P.2d S45 (1955).
2
- Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, § 9.
3. Sutherland Statutory Construction, 3d
Ed. § GS07.
4

- See Nunley v. Stan Katz Ileal Estate,
**;., 15 Utah 2d 120, 338 P.2d 79S
(1064); Price v. Western Loan and Saving Company, 35 Utah 379, 100 P. 077
(1909).

[2,3] The premature filing of the notice of appeal such as was done in this case
should not be regarded as a defect which
will ipso facto entirely deprive the appellate
court of jurisdiction. It is an irregularity
which would be grounds for dismissal of the
appeal within the discretion of the court.
Such remedy would undoubtedly be well advised in the cases where the judgment had
not become definite, or had not become
final, or where remedies before the trial
court had not been exhausted. No such circumstance exists here. The final written
judgment which was filed is exactly in accord with the ruling appealed from. We
cannot see that the defendant was put to
any disadvantage or that his rights were
adversely affected by the irregularity of
procedure here. It is our opinion that the
ends of justice will best be served by hearing the case on its merits.
The motion to dismiss the appeal is
denied.
MCDONOUGH and
CGfleur.

CALLISTER, JJ.,

WADE, J., heard the arguments but died
before the opinion was filed.
HENRIOD, Chief Justice (commenting).
The main opinion in this case, presumably
presented and designed for publication in
the national reports system, is premature.
The matter is before us on motion to dismiss the appeal,—not on a regular appeal,
under the Rules, from a final judgment. It
would be a dangerous precedent if we presumed to pen a definitive and conclusive
decision on any or all motions to dismiss an
appeal.
5. Sees. 77-40-3 and 77-42-1, U.C.A.1953,
require that all errors which do not affect
the substantial rights of the parties must
be disregarded; and § 68-3-2 provides:
"The statutes * * * of this state
* * * and all proceedings under them
are to be liberally construed with a view
to effect the objects of the statute and
to promote justice. * * * "
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The danger of the main opinion, if published as our official decision, laying down
a rule of law under the facts of this case, is
that it would reverse many decisions of this
court to the effect that there can be no appeal except from a final judgment of the
lower court. 1 At the time of filling notice
of appeal in this case, clearly, obviously and
chronologically there was no final judgment
in the record, as the main opinion concedes*
The reasoning seems to be that, "Well, no
one was hurt, so let's ignore the rules and
our cases."
The same reasoning could have been entertained in the cases cited in footnote one
hereof, but wasn't. The same reasoning
could have been indulged in Anderson v.
Anderson, 2 where notice of appeal was filed
only one day late,—even though no party
to the appeal felt it was injured by the delay, but where this court, without anyone
asking it to say so, said whether anyone was
injured or not, the matter was jurisdictional, and that this court had no jurisdiction to hear the matter.
The cases in footnote one, and the Anderson case, with respect to fundamental principles, are identical to this case so far as
jurisdictional concepts are concerned. If
the main opinion is documented and published as the most recent pronouncement of
the law in this state, in my opinion the rules
with respect to 1) appeals from final judgments, and 2) the time within which to file
J. See cases in Note 27, to Rule 72(a),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Vol. 9, p.
782, Utah Code Annotated 1953; Everett
v. Jones, 32 Utah 489, 91 P. 360 (1907);
Candland v. Mellen, 46 Utah 519, 151 P.

them, are impotent, flatulent and no longer
controlling.
I have difficulty in agreeing wholeheartedly with the main opinion's statement that
the "notice of appeal is to advise the opposite party that the appeal has been taken and
of the essentials requisite thereto,"—if that
means that this is the only reason for such
notice. This is a disarming statement,
which, if true, would have required that the
cases in footnote one herein should have
been decided contrariwise, and that Anderson v. Anderson, supra, was erroneously decided In my opinion, the main opinion's
quoted statement is only adjunct, not controlling, as to the main purpose of the notice
of appeal,—to preserve a right and to preserve the jurisdictional status of the courts,
—not simply to apprise adversary parties of
the fact that an appeal has been taken.
Most times people know this by newspaper,
radio, television, and often by word of
mouth or by inquiry of counsel for him who
might be a respondent.
I strongly urge that the main opinion not
be published, since 1) it is a result arising
not out of a regular appeal where the whole
record would be before us, but only on a
motion to dismiss, and 2) it will upset all
the cases we have decided with respect to
appeals from final judgments, and 3) would
reverse Anderson v. Anderson.
I vote to grant the motion to dismiss, on
statutory and precedential grounds.
341 (1915); Haslam v. Paulsen, 15 Utah
-2d 185, 3S9 P.2d 736 (1964).
2. 3 Utah 2d 277, 282 P.2d 845 (1955).
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1 Dean E. Conder, Senior District Judge, sitting by
111 Utah Adv. Rep. 63
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-3-24(1)0) (1987).
IN THE
2. Resource Management Co, v, Weston Ranch and
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1047 (Utah 1985)
(citation omitted) see, Garff Realty Co. v. Better
Buildings, Inc., 120 Utah 344, 234 P.2d 842, 844 ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES
(1951).
COMPANY OF UTAH, INC.,
3. The requirement that the event occur after forPlaintiff and Respondent,
mation of the contract distinguishes a case of supev.
rvening impossibility, such as this, from a case in Harold SEVY; Winona R. Sevy; Security Title
which the contract cannot be performed because of
Company of Southern Utah, as Trustee; and
a mistake, an unknown legal requirement, or other
John
Does I through V,
fact in existence at the time the contract is made. See
Defendants and Appellants.
Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc., 538
P.2d 301, 305-08 (Utah 1975); Sine v. Rudy, 27
Utah 2d 67, 493 P.2d 299 (1972); Mooney v. GR No. 880459-CA
and Assoc, 146 P.2d 1174,1176(Utah App. 1987).
FILED: June 21, 1989
4. See Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., 582
P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 1978) ("[A] party may be reli- Fifth District, Iron County
eved of performing an obligation under a contract Honorable J. Philip Eves
where supervening events, unforeseeable at the time
the contract is made, render performance of the ATTORNEYS:
contract impossible"; the defense did not prevail
Robert F. Orton, Virginia Curtis Lee, Salt
because evidence was insufficient); Transatlantic
Lake City, for Appellants
Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Restatement (Second) of Contracts Willard R. Bishop, Cedar City, for
section 261; J. Calimari & J. Perillo, Contracts, 476
Respondent
et seq. (2d ed. 1977); Utah Code Ann. §70A-2- Before Judges Conder, 1 Garff, and
615(a) (1980) establishes the impossibility defense in
Greenwood.
contracts for the sale of goods.
5. We recognize that the City's failure to approve
OPINION
seems, from our present perspective, to be rather
easy to foresee. However, the critical fact is not
CONDER, Judge:
whether the event could have been foreseen, but
rather, whether the parties actually did foresee it
The Defendants Harold and Winona Sevy
and provide accordingly in their contract. A dictum appeal from a judgment of the district court
in one Utah case on impossibility employs the word
permitting Associates Financial Services
"unforeseeable" in describing the event causing
impossibility, Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co., Company of Utah ("Associates") to foreclose
582 P.2d at 61 (Utah 1978); however, the better and their interest in certain irrigation company
more widely accepted rule looks not to whether the stock. We affirm.
In 1981, the Sevys sold about thirteen acres
parties could or should have foreseen the event, but
rather whether, as a fact of assent, they did foresee of land in Garfield County to Kyle and Cindy
it. Restatement (Second) of Contracts §261 & Stewart, along with 39 shares of the Long
comment b (1981).
Canal Company, which for many years had
6. The trial court made no finding expressly deterfurnished irrigation water to the land.2 To
mining when performance became impossible;
secure payment of the purchase price, the
however, since the parties do not contest the matter
of timing, we presume the trial court's decision to Sevys were beneficiaries of a trust deed covebe correct in this regard. We therefore do not con- ring both the land and the irrigation company
sider whether the award of rent for the period pre- i stock. The trust deed was duly recorded. The
ceding abandonment was erroneous, because the Long Canal Company issued a stock certificross-appeal of that award is based solely on the | cate for the 39 shares in the names of the
argument that Nichols erred in executing the lease,
Stewarts, and this stock certificate remained in
an argument which we rejected above.
the Stewarts' possession.
7. See, Castagno v. Church, 552 P.2d 1282 (Utah
In 1985, the Stewarts obtained a loan from
1976); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §265
(1981); J. Calimari & J. Perillo, Contracts, 495-96 the Lockhart Company, pledging the canal
company stock as collateral. The Lockhart
(2d ed. 1977).
8. We distinguish Jespersen v. Deseret News Publi- Company took possession of the stock certifshing Co., 119 Utah 235, 225 P.2d 1050 (1951) and icate and filed a financing statement covering
General Ins. Co. of America v. Christiansen Furni- the stock. A year later, the Stewarts refinature Co., 119 Utah 470, 229 P.2d 298 (1951) because nced their loan and borrowed from Lockhart
they are based on an argument not raised below or additional funds secured by the same collatin this court. At common law, the application of the eral, bringing the total principal debt to
usual contract defenses to a covenant to pay rent
$12,213 at 16.5% interest. Lockhart thereafter
was limited. We do not reach the question whether
this rule could apply in this case, because it has not assigned the loan and security interest, and
transferred possession of the stock certificate,
been argued.
to Associates.
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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Stewarts filed a petition in bankruptcy, and
the trustee abandoned the irrigation company
stock. Associates thereupon sued to establish
the priority of its security interest in the stock.
The trial court concluded that the stock was
appurtenant to the land and that the Sevys*
security interest would thus have priority
superior to that of Associates, but that the
Sevys were estopped from asserting the priority of their security interest because they
permitted the Stewarts to retain possession of
the stock certificate. Judgment was accordingly entered on November 4, 19873 permitting
Associates to foreclose the Sevys' security
interest.
The Sevys filed notice of appeal designating
the Court of Appeals as the appellate court.
The Iron County Clerk treated the appeal as
to the Supreme Court, and further filings and
motions prior to briefing were made in the
Supreme Court. The case was eventually transferred by the Supreme Court to this Court.
Associates asserts a lack of appellate jurisdiction based on the fact that the notice of
appeal indicates that the appeal is taken to the
Court of Appeals. Appellate jurisdiction in
this type of case is properly in the Supreme
Court, 4 and therefore, the Sevys' notice of
appeal was incorrect in stating that the appeal
was taken to the Court of Appeals. However,
the rules of both Courts recognize that such
an error is inconsequential.5 Moreover, the
error caused no real harm in this case, because
all filings and proceedings on appeal were
before the Supreme Court until the case was
transferred here, despite the error on the
notice of appeal. Since the purpose of the
notice of appeal is fundamentally to give
notice that an appeal has been taken, 6 and
since no party or court seems to have been
misinformed by the error, we find that the
notice of appeal is sufficient to establish
appellate jurisdiction, despite the error in
specifying the appropriate appellate court.
We turn to the question of the relative priorities of the parties' security interests7 in the
irrigation company stock, a question of first
impression. The trial court based its decision
that the Sevys had superior priority on a line
of cases interpreting Utah Code Ann. §73-110 (1980), which states that water rights
"represented by shares of stock in a corporation .... shall not be deemed to be appurtenant
to the land ...." Those words have been held
to create a mere presumption that irrigation
company stock is not transferred with a conveyance of the land to which the stock has
provided water, and the presumption is rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence.8 All
of these cases involved a conveyance of full
title rather than creation or priority of a security interest, the issue being whether the irr- ,
igation stock was included in a conveyance of
the land on which the water was used.
Applying the case law just described to
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establish superior priority in the Sevys would
be at variance with the priority structure prescribed by Article 9 of the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code. Priority under Utah Code
Ann. §70A-9-312(5) (1980) is determined
generally according to the date on which the
security interest is perfected. For an
"instrument" such as a certificated security,
perfection is accomplished by possession of
the certificate evidencing the security, except
for a 21-day period of automatic perfection
immediately after attachment of the security
interest.9 The Sevys did not take possession of
the irrigation company stock certificate, and
thus did not perfect their security interest in
the irrigation company stock. Therefore,
under Article 9, their priority is inferior to
that of Associates, whose predecessor took
possession of the certificate and transferred
possession of it to Associates.
For Article 9 to apply, the irrigation
company stock must fall within the definition
of an "instrument/ which is defined in Utah
Code Ann. §70A-9-105(l)(i) as including a
"security." "Security" is in turn defined in
§70A-8-102(l)(a), which provides:
(a) A "security" is an instrument
which (i) is issued in bearer or registered form; and (ii) is of a type
commonly dealt in upon securities
exchanges or markets or commonly
recognized in any area in which it is
issued or dealt in as a medium for
investment; and (iii) is either one of
a class or a series or by its terms is
divisible into a class or series of
instruments; and (iv) evidences a
share, participation or other interest
in property or in an enterprise or
evidences an obligation of the
issuer.
The stock here in question appears to be
issued in registered form as some of a series or
classes of corporate stock, and the stock certificate evidences a share in the irrigation
enterprise of the Long Canal Company. The
Sevys assert, however, that the stock is not "of
a type commonly dealt in jpon securities
exchanges or markets or commonly recognized
in [Utah] as a medium for irvestment." We
are nevertheless of the opinion that irrigation
company stock is a "medium of investment."
It may be true that there is no established
stock exchange or institutionalized market for
trading in irrigation company stock in Utah.
However, the stock of an irrigation company
ordinarily embodies its capital, provides a
return to its owners in the form of water use,
and was the means by which it amassed the
resources to obtain its water rights and build
its water transport and distribution system. It
is accordingly a medium of investment.
In holding that Article 9 establishes the
superior priority of Associates' security inte-
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rest, we distinguish the line of cases holding
that stock in an irrigation company may be
appurtenant to, and impliedly conveyed with,
an interest in real property. The rule of those
cases does not apply to the creation and perfection of security interests in irrigation
company stock. This conclusion is grounded in
the rule that a later statute supersedes an
earlier statute if the two are in conflict,10
inasmuch as the Uniform Commercial Code,
enacted in 1965 in Utah, followed in time
section 73-1-10 of Utah Code Ann., which
was last amended in 1959. Moreover, in view
of the importance of uniformity and predictability in commercial law," we favor a result
which will not have the effect of creating an
exception to the Article 9 priority structure for
something which has the appearance of fitting
rather clearly within that structure. We also
note, as the trial court did, that it is equitable,
as between Sevys and Associates, that the loss
resulting from the double collateralization fall
upon the Sevys, who, albeit unwittingly, left
the Stewarts in the position to again borrow
on the stock.
We therefore hold that the security interest
of Associates in the irrigation company stock
is prior to the unperfected security interest of
the Sevys, and that Associates may foreclose
the Sevys' security interest in accordance with
Article 9 of the Utah Uniform Commercial
Code. The order of the district court is therefore affirmed. 12
Dean E. Conder, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
1. Dean E. Conder, Senior District Judge, sitting by
special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-3-24(1)0) (1987).
2. Irrigation companies are a common legal means
of owning and distributing irrigation water in Utah.
Many of them began as cooperative enterprises by
early settlers and eventually took corporate form,
usually on a not-for-profit basis. The ownership
of stock in such a company typically gives the stockholder the right to receive a pan of the
company's water proportionate to the 'amount
owned. The ownership of stock in the irrigation
company thus becomes in some respects tantamount
to ownership of the water rights themselves.
3. Associates argues that the notice of appeal is
untimely, based on the fact that the date stamped
on the judgment as the date of entry was altered.
There is no claim, however, of unauthorized tampering with the court records, or even of error in
showing the date of entry as November 4, 1987. We
therefore conclude that the notice of appeal was
timely filed.
4. Compare Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 with Utah
Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (1988).
5. R. Utah Sup. Ct. 4C; R. Utah Ct. App. 4C.
6. Wood v. Turner, 18 Utah 2d 229, 419 P.2d 634,
635 (1966); Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc.,
15 Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 798 (1964).

7. The trust deed of which the Sevys were named
beneficiaries suffices as a security agreement and
both parties appear to have satisfied the prerequisites of Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-203 (1980) for
creation and attachment of their security interests in
the stock.
S. Roundy v. Coombs, 668 P.2d 550 (Utah 1983); AbJbott v. Christensen, 660 P.2d 254 (Utah 1983); Hatch
v. Adams, 7 Utah 2d 73, 318 P.2d 633, afFd
on reh., 8 Utah 2d 82, 329 P.2d 285 (1958) (decided
on rehearing on the basis of the parol evidence rule)
Brimm v. Cache Valley Banking Co., 2 Utah 2d 93,
269 P.2d 859 (1954).
9. Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-304(l), (4) (1980); see aiso
R. Henson, Handbook on Secured Transactions 108-110(1973).
10. Pride Club v. Miller, 572 P.2d 385, 387 (Utah
1977); see aiso Ellis v. Utah State Retirement Bd.,
757 P.2d 882, 884-85 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
11. See, Utah Code Ann. §70A-1-102(1) (1980)
and §70A-l-102(2)(c); Butts v. Glendale
Plywood Co. 710 F.2d 504, 506 (9th Cir. 1983).
12. Because we hold that Associates' security interest is prior to that of the Sevys, we do not reach
the question of estoppel on which the district court
based its decision, or the question whether the
material facts concerning estoppel were in dispute so
as to preclude summary judgment.
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Douglas R. OLSEN,
Petitioner,
v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Utah, Tyger
Construction, Wausau Insurance Company,
and Second Injury Fund,
Respondents.
No. 880407-CA
FILED: June 23, 1989
Original Proceeding in this Court
ATTORNEYS:
Jay A. Meservy, Salt Lake City, for Petitioner
Michael E. Dyer and Brad C. Betebenner, Salt
Lake City, for Respondents Tyger
Construction and Wausau Insurance
Company
Erie V. Boorman, Salt Lake City, for
Respondent Second Injury Fund
Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Billings.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
Petitioner Douglas Olsen appeals from the
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